Showing posts with label possible worlds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label possible worlds. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Identity and possible worlds

Is the relation of numerical identity contingent or necessary? It seems that in many cases identity statements are contingent. Gottlob Frege explained how it is possible that true identity statements can be informative. We may understand the meanings of names “a” and “b” without knowing that they refer to one and the same object, hence the statement “a = b” tells us more than the trivial truth that an object is identical with itself. It is tempting to interpret Frege’s result as implying that the identity “a = b” could be false, i.e. that there is a possible world in which “a” and “b” refer to different objects while retaining their original meanings. Saul Kripke famously questioned that suggestion. Kripke claims that all identity statements are in fact necessarily true, and he presents a formal argument in support of his claim. The argument is based on two premises. (1) Every object is necessarily identical with itself (For all x, it is necessary that x = x). (2) If x has property P and y is identical with y, then y has P. Premise (2) is a variant of Leibniz’s law. We can now use the formula “It is necessary that x = x” and, given that x = y, we can substitute y for x, obtaining “It is necessary that x = y”. In conclusion, (1) and (2) lead to the statement: (3) For all x, y, if x = y, then it is necessary that x = y. From (3) it follows that if we take any proper names “a” and “b”, then if only it is true that a = b, it is necessarily so.

But how can we reconcile this formal result with the intuition expressed at the beginning of the previous paragraph? In the actual world the names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” refer to the same object: the planet Venus. But couldn’t it be the case that in some other possible world Hesperus and Phosphorus were different objects? Kripke explains away this intuition by pointing out that the possible situation in which we would be tempted to say that Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus can be reinterpreted in such a way that the identity will be preserved. According to Kripke, terms “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are so-called rigid designators, i.e. terms that refer to the same object in all possible worlds in which they refer to anything at all. “Hesperus” is not synonymous with the description “The brightest star on the morning sky”, nor is “Phosphorus” synonymous with “The brightest star on the evening sky”. These descriptions are used contingently in the actual world to fix the reference of both names. In another world the descriptions may not pick the object which is the referent of both terms (i.e. the planet Venus), but if Venus exists in this world, both terms “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” will continue referring to it.

It may be pointed out that when we restrict the thesis of the necessity of identity statements to rigid designators, its truth becomes quite trivial. However, Kripke claims that his thesis has non-trivial consequences regarding for instance the mind-body controversy. Without going into too much detail, let us consider the Identity Theory, according to which mental events are numerically identical with some physical events. The identity theorists maintain that their claim is true but only contingently, i.e. in some possible worlds there are beings that possess particular neurological states but lack mental states (so-called zombies), and in other possible worlds there may be disembodied minds. But according to Kripke’s analysis, if the statement “This pain is identical with this stimulation of the nervous system” is true, it is necessary, and hence neither zombies nor disembodied minds are possible. But couldn’t we explain away these possible scenarios in a similar way we have redescribed the Hesperus-Phosphorus case? Namely, couldn’t we just say that the rigid designators “this pain” and “this stimulation of the nervous system” are contingently associated with some descriptions, which fail to pick the same object in alternative possible worlds? Unfortunately, as Kripke points out, the terms referring to mental states have no associated descriptions, because their reference is fixed directly by the person that is in a given mental state. So the case of the mind-body identification is different from the case of the Hesperus-Phosphorus identity.

What is the ontological status of possible worlds? One radical answer to this question is known under the name of modal realism (possibilism), which has been proposed by David Lewis. Modal realism consists of several claims. One of them is that possible worlds are made up of concrete, spatiotemporal objects. Possible worlds are not fictions or abstract constructions, but real places with flesh-and-blood inhabitants. Things contained in other possible worlds exist in the same fundamental sense as things in the actual world. Thus it is legitimate to assume that the variables of the existential quantifier range over all possible worlds. For the sake of convenience we may want to relativise the notion of existence to a particular world (speaking about “existing-in-a-world”), but this relativisation does not imply any significant ontological difference. The second element of the doctrine of modal realism is that there is nothing fundamental and absolute about the notion of actual world. The term “actual” is indexical (analogously to terms such as “here”, “now”, “I”, whose meaning depends on the context of utterance), which means that each possible world is actual from the perspective of its inhabitants. Finally, modal realism assumes that possible worlds are spatiotemporally and causally separated from each other. One important consequence of these assumptions is that one object cannot exist in more than one world. Transworld identity is an empty notion in modal realism. But how can we interpret the modal statement “This two-metre high tree could be five metres high” without assuming that this tree can exist in other possible worlds? Lewis solves this problem by introducing the notion of a counterpart. This tree has many counterparts in other possible worlds – trees that are sufficiently similar to it, but not numerically identical. An object could have a given property, if one of its counterparts possesses this property in some possible world.

The main motivation for modal realism comes from its radically reductive character. Lewis subscribes to nominalism and he uses the concept of concrete possible worlds to give a reductive analysis of various abstract entities, such as properties, propositions or meanings. For instance a proposition is simply defined as a class of possible worlds (the proposition “Snow is white” is the class of possible worlds in which snow is white). According to this definition, proposition p is true in a world w, if w is an element of the class of worlds p. Properties, in turn, are defined as functions which assign a set of objects to each possible world. These sets are intuitively understood as consisting of objects that possess a given property in a particular world. This definition avoids the well-known difficulty resulting from the fact that two numerically distinct properties can nevertheless have the same extension in the actual world. The property of being an elephant and the property of being the largest land animal living on Earth now may have the same extensions in the actual world, but there are possible worlds in which elephants are not the largest living land animals. However, reductions offered by modal realists are often criticised as not entirely adequate. For instance, it is pointed out that all necessary true propositions become identical. But we believe that there is a difference between the statements “2+2 = 4” and “It is snowing or it is not snowing”. Similarly, it can be maintained that the property of being triangular and being trilateral are different, and yet in all possible worlds their extensions are identical.

Modal realism is often rejected on grounds of its extravagant ontology. An alternative position is offered in the form of actualism (moderate realism). Alvin Plantinga suggests that possible worlds are mere theoretical constructions which enable us to formulate non-reductive explanations of modal notions. The only genuine world is the actual world, and the quantification in our language should be restricted to objects in the actual world. Possible worlds different from the actual world can be defined as complete and consistent sets of propositions, or better as complete and consistent states of affairs (situations). Each proposition corresponds to a given state of affairs. All states of affairs are abstract objects which exist in the actual world, but only some of them obtain (those that correspond to true propositions). False propositions describe existing states of affairs which nevertheless don’t obtain. According to actualism, the expression “actual” has an absolute meaning: it refers to one and only world that truly exists.

One important difference between actualism and possibilism regards the notion of transworld identity. Actualism admits that one object can exist in many possible worlds. But how are we to understand this statement, if possible worlds do not exist literally, but are mere constructions out of abstract objects? Plantinga proposes the following solution. That an object a exists in a possible world w means that if w were actual, a would exist in it. Note that the explicans is a counterfactual conditional, but it cannot be interpreted in terms of possible worlds, since this would require an introduction of second-order possible worlds (a possible world in which another possible world would be actual). This fact shows that Plantinga’s conception does not offer a fully reductive analysis of modal notions, and that some modalities have to be taken as primitive.


Readings:

M.J. Loux, "The necesary and the possible", pp. 153-186, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction.

E.J. Lowe, "Necessity and identity", pp. 84-95, "Possible worlds", pp. 120-133, A Survey of Metaphysics.

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Modality

Modal notions, such as possibility and necessity, play an important role in metaphysical considerations. Intuitively, we can distinguish two ways of speaking about possibilities. We can say that it is now possible that an object might change in the future. For instance this chair may be painted in a colour different from the one it has right now. This type of possibility can be called temporal. But in a different sense it is possible that the chair might have a different colour right now – if it had been painted this colour before. This kind of possibility, which applies to the present time as well as to the past (I can say that I might have been born in a different town), will be referred to as counterfactual possibility. It is interesting to notice that counterfactual and temporal notions of possibility are logically independent, i.e. one does not imply the other. From the fact that some state of affairs is counterfactually possible it does not follow that this state of affairs is possible temporarily. A given sculpture could have a different shape now, but once it receives its actual shape it cannot be turned into a different statue in the future (Rodin’s sculpture “The kiss” could have been “The thinker” in the counterfactual sense, but not in the temporal sense). Conversely, although a seed can grow into a tree in the future, it could not be a tree right now. It should be added that counterfactual possibility, in spite of what the term suggests, does not exclude actuality. Actual states of affair are considered possible in the counterfactual sense.

Counterfactual possibility is often presented in the language that uses the concept of possible worlds. A proposition is possible if it is true in some possible worlds. Possible worlds themselves are usually interpreted as complexes (sums) of situations (states of affairs). An example of a possible situation may be that Poland has a king now. Possible worlds have to satisfy two conditions: the condition of consistency and the condition of completeness. A situation s is consistent if there is no proposition p such that p and not-p are true in s. A situation s is complete if for all propositions p, either p is true in s or not-p is true in s. From these two conditions it follows that two numerically distinct possible worlds are mutually exclusive (incompatible), i.e. there is a proposition p such that p is true in one world, and p is false in the other one. Situations that are not complete don’t have to be exclusive. An example: that this ball is red and that this ball is round. The world that we live in is called the actual world, and it is interpreted in the same way as other possible worlds. It is natural to assume that the actual world is complete, i.e. every proposition is either true or its negation is true in the actual world.

Let us see how we can use the notion of possible worlds in order to explicate some modal terms, such as possibility, necessity and contingency. These notions can be applied to propositions as well as to objects. Proposition p is possible iff p is true in some possible world. Proposition p is necessary iff p is true in all possible worlds. And p is contingent iff p is true in some possible worlds and it’s false in some possible worlds. Similarly we can define possible, necessary and contingent objects. A possible object is an object that exists in some possible worlds. A necessary object exists in all possible worlds, and a contingent object exists in some worlds, but in some it does not. The usual examples of necessary truths are the laws of logic and of mathematics. Necessary beings, in turn, typically include mathematical objects and other abstract objects. Some also cite God as an example of a necessary being. It is open to a debate whether there are any spatiotemporal necessary objects (perhaps the universe as a whole can satisfy this requirement).

Let us make an important distinction between modality de re and de dicto. Modality de dicto applies to the entire sentence, whereas modality de re is attributed to a given object. The sentence “It is possible that some man is the present king of Poland” belongs to the de dicto type, whereas “Some man is possibly the king of Poland” is de re. The first sentence can be presented in a semi-formal way as “It is possible that for some x, x is a man and x is the king of Poland”, and this sentence in turn is true if and only if there is a possible world in which Poland has a king. The second sentence translates into “For some x, x is a man and it is possible that x is the king of Poland”, and in order for this proposition to be true, there has to exist someone in the actual world who, in another possible world is the king of Poland. (These explications presuppose of course that one and the same object can exist in different possible worlds.) The second proposition logically implies the first, but the implication in the opposite direction is a matter of some controversy (the validity of the so-called Barcan law). Another example illustrating the de re/de dicto distinction is as follows: “The number of planets in the solar system is necessarily divisible by 2” (de re) and “It is necessary that the number of planets in the solar system is divisible by 2” (de dicto). The first translates into “There is an x such that x is the number of planets in the solar system and it is necessary that x is divisible by 2”, and the second reads “It is necessary that there is an x such that x is the number of planets in the solar system and x is divisible by 2”. The truth of the first sentence follows from the simple arithmetical fact that 8 is (necessarily) divisible by 2, but for the second sentence to be true, the number of planets in all possible worlds would have to be even.

We can now define an important notion of an essential property. P is an essential property of object a iff for every possible world w, if a exists in w, a has P in w. Loosely speaking, if an object loses its essential property, it ceases to be itself. Napoleon’s essential property is being a human, but being the victor from Austerlitz belongs to his accidental properties (in some possible worlds Napoleon lost the battle of Austerlitz). It is interesting to ask whether things have individual essences, i.e. essential properties such that only one object can possess them all. More specifically, the individual essence of object a is a set S of essential properties of a such that in any possible world w, if x possesses all properties from S, x is identical with a. Some philosophers claim that the individual essence of an object a is the property of being identical with a. However, this interpretation prevents us from using the notion of essence in order to explicate transworld identity. According to a different view, an object’s individual essence is its origin, i.e. the cause of its existence. In the case of human beings, their essence would be determined by the zygote (the fertilized egg) that developed into a particular person. Yet another version of essentialism insists that an object’s essence is its constitution, i.e. all parts the object consists of.

Further reading:

E.J. Lowe, Chapter 5, “Necessity and identity”, pp. 79-84; Chapter 6 “Essentialism”, pp. 98-114, in: A Survey of Metaphysics.